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I. INTRODUCTION 
Several developed nations around the world are grappling 
with high healthcare expenditures and unsatisfactory outcomes. 
High level country benchmarks show that there is wide 
variation in health outcomes for countries with similar levels of 
income and education [1,2,3], and the US healthcare system in 
particular is often singled out as the least effective system 
amongst developed countries [4]. A common US and UK 
characteristic is that the highest source of healthcare 
expenditures are hospital services and infrastructure [5,6]. 
Consequently, the strategies and operations developed and 
implemented by hospitals have a significant effect on access, 
quality, and cost of care [7].  This paper’s intended contribution 
is twofold. Firstly, to provide a system’s perspective of 
healthcare beyond traditional high level country benchmarking 
exercises, and conduct two exploratory cases of leading 
hospital enterprises, one from the US and another from the UK, 
so as to further our understanding of hospitals’ inherent system 
complexity, which has remained buried within traditional high 
level comparative country statistics. Secondly, to address a 
recent call from the systems engineering community to adopt a 
multidisciplinary research approach that combines both 
qualitative and quantitative methods with the goal of further 
supporting the systems-of-systems (SoS) practice. 
II. A SOS PERSPECTIVE ON HEALTHCARE 
Commenting on the US healthcare system, the president of 
Johns Hopkins University said: “Simply stated, the US does not 
have a health care system” [8]. Contributing to this statement is 
the fact that the provision of medical care entails a complex 
and technically sophisticated enterprise that encompasses many 
different parties [9] which often times are not aligned with one 
another (Fig. 1).The key categories often referred to when 
assessing the performance of the healthcare system are access, 
quality, and cost. In terms of access, an estimated 15% of the 
US population is uninsured [10], as much as 75% of care 
providers practice alone or in groups of five or fewer [11]. As 
for quality, adults on average are said to only receive as little as 
55% of the recommended care for many common conditions 
[12], and as many as 98,000 annual deaths are attributed to 
medical errors [13]. Finally, the US spends 16% of its GDP on 
healthcare expenditures, of which 30 – 40% is believed to be 
wasteful [14]. Furthermore, Donald Berwick, chief executive 
officer of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), 
emphasized that the problem of healthcare redesign becomes 
increasingly “harder and the evidence weaker as one moves 
from the microsystem to the organization” [15]. The 
microsystem refers to the care given at service unit level (e.g. 
emergency department), whereas the organization is the care 
provider facility (e.g. hospital) that supports one or more 
microsystems. An opportunity exists to adopt a systems 
thinking approach and address this call for an enterprise 
perspective capable of furthering our understanding of 
hospitals socio-technical complexity. 
This paper is presented here with permission of the author in accordance with the IEEE copyright and consent guidelines accessible at 
http://lean.mit.edu/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=2534&Itemid=776Figure 1.  Multilevel stakeholder decomposition of a healthcare system. 
III. RESEARCH ROADMAP 
The derived research methodology is informed by Tien’s 
[16] characterization of the services sector from a system’s 
perspective which offers that modern SoS are becoming 
increasingly more human-centered, and hence more complex, 
thus requiring a multidisciplinary approach including 
techniques from the social sciences and management, as well 
as those of science and engineering. Similarly, Rhodes [17] 
states that there is an urgent need for empirical studies of an 
exploratory nature so as to obtain preliminary findings, 
heuristics, and researchable hypotheses towards attaining more 
effective systems engineering practices. 
A. Exploratory Case Sample 
In October 2006, the Engineering Systems Division, at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, held a workshop 
charged with the creation of a draft Healthcare Research 
Agenda. The senior leadership of two leading hospitals (Table 
I), one in the US and one in the UK, attending the workshop 
agreed to house empirical exploratory work with the objective 
of furthering our understanding of the inherent complexity of 
hospitals, and also of demonstrating the benefits of a systems 
thinking research approach.  
TABLE I.  EXPLORATORY CASE SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Characteristic US Boston Hospital UK London Hospital 
Ownership Non-profit physician owned group practice 
Non-profit National 
Health System (NHS) 
Foundation 
Type Multispecialty tertiary urban hospital 
Multispecialty tertiary 
urban hospital 
Total Beds 327 872 
Total Staff 4263 5534 
ED Visits 38,631 141,000 
Total Income $679,454,000 $745,316,000 
Operating 
Income $50,929,000 $20,045,600 
B. Case Studies Initial Exploratory Questions 
Despite being ranked at the top 1% acute hospitals by 
various third party agencies in their respective countries, both 
hospitals were facing increasing pressure in specific functional 
areas. The Boston based hospital was grappling with the US 
nationwide problem of Emergency Department overcrowding, 
whereas the London based hospital was readying itself for an 
increased governmental pressure to shorten elective surgery 
operating waiting lists. Both burning platforms served as 
different entry exploratory questions which are consistent with 
the case study research strategy [18]: 
• US Boston Hospital: How to speed patient flow in the 
Emergency Department (ED)? 
• UK London Hospital: How to increase productivity in 
the Operating Rooms (OR)? 
As a research strategy, “the distinguishing characteristic of 
the case study is that it attempts to examine (a) a contemporary 
phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when (b) the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” [19]. Data was collected with multiple methods so as 
to allow for triangulation and theoretical saturation [20].  
Exploratory work followed the process prescribed by 
Eisenhardt [21] in case selection, crafting research instruments 
and protocols, entering the field, analyzing the data, shaping 
hypothesis, enfolding literature, and reaching closure.  
C. Boston Hospital Case Description 
Senior hospital leaders described the ED as a loss leader, 
that patients consistently filled up the waiting room, that staff 
were churning at a high rate, and that considerable tension 
existed between the ED and other parts of the hospital as they 
blamed each other for the overcrowding in the ED. Root cause 
analysis led the research to gradually progress from the ED 
onto other areas of the hospital, thereby examining multiple 
levels of the organization. 
Both qualitative and quantitative data evidence were 
collected through observation, archival records, documentation, 
and interviews. An initial patient flow walkthrough was hosted 
by a senior nurse praised as the "bed czar". Over a period of 
four months several site visits were made at different times, 
and a non-participatory research role was taken in observing 
operations in the ED and specific inpatient units. Initial 
analysis revealed tension felt at the ED interfaces, mostly 
stemming from its interactions with inpatient hospital 
operations, thus prompting targeted semi structured interviews 
with management level staff from the pharmacy, imaging, and 
a random selection of inpatient units. The interviews revealed 
perceptual data on the ED’s key limitations. End-to-end patient 
flow objective data was made possible after integrating 
fragmented electronic medical records available in the inpatient 
and outpatient settings. A one year longitudinal data sample 
was collected clearly demonstrating the patient flow from the 
ED onto the inpatient hospital side and finally onto discharge. 
The data integration exercise was assisted by two senior nurses 
who had inconsistent process level mental models that were 
only clarified through value stream map exercises. All analysis 
and results were shared and validated with senior leadership. 
D. London Hospital Case Description 
Senior hospital leaders described that the ORs had to 
undergo considerable productivity improvement if they were to 
keep up with the imminent government policy change towards 
shortening elective surgery waiting lists. Although asked to 
study the ORs specifically, once again, root cause analyses led 
the research to gradually progress onto other functional areas 
and examine multiple organizational levels. 
The evidence was collected over a one month onsite study 
and was mostly qualitative given that available quantitative 
data would have either entailed a prohibitive coding effort (i.e. 
paper based) or had considerable integrity issues (i.e. missing 
data fields). As such, qualitative data collection included 
multiple types of ORs (Main; Cardio Thoracic; Neurosurgery) 
allowing to compare and contrast operations and interactions 
with other service units. A total of 15 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted and transcribed, as well as six non 
participatory meetings. Additionally, one of the authors 
conducted a summer surgery rotation at the hospital, allowing 
her to explore the ORs, ED, and wards. Only the hospital CEO 
was aware of her involvement in this study. Finally, other 
sources of data included documentation and observation. Two 
initial Main OR walkthroughs were facilitated separately. 
Interviews were then conducted at both nurse and physician 
levels which worked in ORs and/or patient wards. Interview 
transcripts underwent initial and focused coding according to 
grounded theory while using specialized text analysis software 
(i.e. MAXQDA), and their contents were systematically 
compared and contrasted to assess internal validity of findings. 
The end result of the analysis was shared and validated with 
senior leadership. 
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IV. RESULTS 
TABLE II.  US BOSTON HOSPITAL CASE RESULTS 
Characteristic Description 
Lack of strategy 
alignment 
The ED was not mentioned in any of the strategic and operational plans, which probably explained the apparent lack of concern from 
several inpatient service units towards the ED and fueled the culture of blame and the feeling of neglect from ED staff. 
Lack of end-to-
end view 
Having integrated data from three different hospital information systems we derived an unprecedented end-to-end view of patient flow 
to inform both the research and decision making. Up until that point senior hospital leaders exhibited quick fix behavior. An example 
includes the desire to purchase self chek-in kiosks for the ED when such process represented as little as 3% of patient waiting time. 
Another example was the failed investments in lean consultants who favored local optimization and neglected an end-to-end view. 
Fragmented 
patient 
experience 
During a single hospital stay patients suffering from multiple illnesses would benefit from team based specialized care. However, if a 
patient visited the hospital in different occasions, he or she would have to repeatedly provide the same information to the medical staff, 
and often times have difficulty in coordinating their care. The senior leadership preferred metric of total number of annual patient visits 
obscured patient experience (e.g. 2 patients visiting 3 times each was considered the same as 6 visits by the same patient). 
State of the art 
silos 
The information system backbone was said to be state of the art, and indeed it was within each service unit. However, the ED systems 
were completely independent and thus required medical record printouts to be sent with each admitted patient in order to then manually 
insert the information in another system. 
Probing beyond 
the ED 
Data analysis revealed two distinct patient samples in terms of time spent in the ED (i.e. admitted and non admitted patients). 
Interestingly the average time spent in the ED by non admitted patients was roughly 4 hours whereas the admitted patients were 
spending more than 8 hours on average. Having controlled for patient health stabilization we analytically corroborated anecdotal 
evidence of patient boarding and extended the analysis scope beyond the ED 
Multiple internal 
organizational 
configurations 
Quantitative and qualitative data analysis characterized varying levels of performance in the interaction between different pairs of 
service units. Informed by an emerging holistic enterprise architecture (EA) framework [22], subsequent exploratory inquiry revealed 
considerable variation of policies, strategy, process, organization, knowledge, and information technology. 
TABLE III.  UK LONDON HOSPITAL CASE RESULTS 
Characteristic Description 
Unifying 
external entity 
The strong influence of the UK’s Department of Health was noted when one of its policies (i.e. maximum waiting time of 18 weeks 
between primary care referral and specialist treatment) was tracked at multiple levels of the enterprise (e.g. senior leaders, managers, 
physicians, and nurses). In essence, an external entity (i.e. NHS) was setting a unifying vision for the hospital as a whole. 
Misaligned 
strategy and 
operations 
Senior leaders recited the hospital's value proposition as one spanning the needs of local, national, and international patient populations. 
However, care providers and managers expressed that such a value proposition induced significant stress in operations as it involved 
servicing significantly different types of patients. Strategy, process, and organization were misaligned. 
Limited 
incentives 
Physicians with US and UK experience noted the highly bureaucratic and stifling career progression in the UK. Furthermore, the 
existence of national pay scales whereby care givers earn the same baseline salary regardless of where they practice within the NHS, was 
consistently linked to a lack of motivation towards continuous operational and knowledge improvement. 
Organizational 
divide 
Senior leaders were all non clinicians and referred to as "Executive Suits" by the care practitioners (i.e. nurses and physicians). Care 
practitioners felt controlled by senior leaders via the care group managers and service unit coordinators (both non clinicians), as well as 
by the internal team of former Airbus expert lean engineers charged with driving process improvement. The divide was also present 
between service units (e.g. different specialties not talking with one another), and among clinicians (i.e. nurses and physicians). 
Silo based 
management 
Senior leaders considered the Main ORs inefficient but ignored external influences (e.g. patient stuck in ward, unavailable patient test 
results, etc). Similarly, the internal lean team focused at the process level of each service unit and ignored subjective data. Additionally, 
each service unit had its own procurement, hiring, systems, and scheduling practices, thus rendering any coordination highly complex and 
error prone. Generally, smaller and independent service units were said to perform better than the larger interconnected ones. 
Cross boundary 
coordination 
The ORWIG (OR Ward Integration Group) was a weekly meeting solely attended by nurses from ORs and wards, and was facilitated by 
a manager. The ORWIG was a tightly knit group that addressed dysfunctionalities and took satisfaction in improvements (e.g. they 
unanimously cheered "Yes!" when the manager announced an above 90% patient discharge according to plan). A similar group existed 
amongst physicians, whose leader expressed his frustration given the lack of senior executive leadership support to induce change. 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In general, despite the significant regulatory and payment 
differences between the US and UK healthcare systems, it 
was surprising to see the similarity of issues at hospital 
operational and strategic levels. Nonetheless, it is important 
to note the clear difference of having an external entity set a 
unifying goal (i.e. 18 Weeks) which becomes present at all 
levels of the hospital enterprise. Similarly, an important 
distinguishing factor was the much more pronounced 
Organizational Divide observed at the London Hospital. 
Notably, healthcare systems are said to be fragmented and 
multispecialty hospitals are the preferred model to follow, 
however both of the leading hospitals studied also revealed a 
considerable degree of internal fragmentation. 
Over the years organizational theorists have studied 
organizational behavior and attempted to explain it with a 
minimum set of organizational types (e.g. bureaucracy, 
adhocracy, simple, etc) while positing that only one such 
type dominates in each organization. For instance, the 
organic type describes complex environments characterized 
by high levels of uncertainty and argues for the 
predominance of non-standardized processes and high levels 
of mutual adjustment. However, the London Hospital had 
such an environment but mostly exhibited a silo behavior 
amongst different medical specialties and across enterprise 
levels, and relied in a few dedicated, skilled, and 
overburdened boundary spanning employees (i.e. organic) 
which were a minority rather than the majority. 
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The emergent hypothesis of this research is that multiple 
internal organizational design configurations exist within a 
single hospital enterprise and vary in their capability of 
supporting the performance of different service units in the 
context of the overall hospital enterprise. In light of that, 
several different aspects of organizational design were 
considered (e.g. incentives, strategic alignment, leadership 
support, information systems, cross boundary coordination, 
holistic process, etc) and offered as potential contributing 
factors for the observed behavior. When comparing both 
hospitals, the importance of studying different internal 
configurations is reinforced. For instance, the London 
Hospital compensated for its weak information systems with 
routine cross boundary meetings, continuous improvement 
culture amongst nurses, and heroic staff efforts. In a way, the 
strength/weakness of an organizational aspect translated into 
potential slack/stress upon the other remaining aspects 
depending on the service unit under consideration.  
Finally, the multi-method exploratory cases, informed by 
the emerging holistic EA framework [22] were essential. The 
following are some of our key insights into this research 
strategy: 
1) Narrow thinking to begin with: senior leaders at both 
hospitals suggested that the research focus at an 
underperforming segment which was supposedly solvable in 
isolation. In both cases the exploratory research found reason 
to expand the analysis scope and in doing so identified 
similar types of issues, and potentially transferrable best 
practices and best principles. Similarly, both hospitals used 
the services of expert lean engineers, either hired internally 
or externally, and both experienced difficulty in attaining 
measurable results in areas that required boundary 
interfacing. Instead, our SoS exploratory approach was both 
holistic and beyond process and yielded further insight into 
dysfunctionalities and underlying hospital complexity. 
2) Organizational support: senior leadership support is 
an essential ingredient to allow for research breadth and 
depth. The ability to share intermediate results, directly 
linked to chief concerns, and to elaborate on potential 
avenues for further data collection and analysis, allowed us 
to nourish the necessary credibility for the organization to 
gradually provide access to sensitive and sparse resources. 
3) Grounded theory isn’t soft research: a grounded 
theory approach values the exploration of a given context in 
order to observe, identify, and eventually measure a given 
phenomena of interest. It does not concern itself solely with 
the coding and visualization of qualitative data. It allows for 
both qualitative and quantitative data, and unlike a pure case 
study research strategy, it encourages the continuous 
refinement of the supporting literature included in the study. 
4) Research design refinement: exploratory research may 
require significant research design refinement. The objective 
data driven analysis followed in the Boston Hospital Case 
was not transferable to the second case given the limited 
electronic medical record capability. Also, informed by our 
first case we realized the importance of recruiting a clinician 
(second author) in order to better explore the management 
and clinical enterprise dimensions in the second case. 
A research project is underway to further explore the 
hypothesized relationship between hospital EA and hospital 
enterprise performance, stemming from the characterized 
variable internal organizational configurations which 
exhibited different performance. The two exploratory cases 
described in this paper are examples of the important 
contribution that SoS research can provide to the ongoing 
healthcare debate, whereby the conveyed understanding of 
hospital inherent system complexity allows to reach beyond 
high level comparative statistics and move towards rigorous 
studies that enable and recommend best practice sharing. 
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